These standards can result from public legislation, for example through the EU Food Laws. Or, where specific legislation is missing, it is common for vocal consumer concerns to be turned into labels or standards. A raft of carbon labelling initiatives has hit the market since 2007. Most of these are private voluntary standard (PVS) that are initiated, implemented, and maintained by retailers.

These standards could be expected to benefit many people in developed consumer societies. Governments would benefit from a widespread carbon standard, which would raise consumer (voter) awareness of the carbon implications of their purchases. If governments were ever to find themselves in a position to compel their electorates to emit less carbon in order to comply with international agreements, the required legislation would be easier to implement if the historic data, which such a management system would generate, were in place. In addition, consumers may be more open to such moves if they have already made some movement towards a preference for low carbon products themselves.

Consumers who express concern over the carbon emissions would also benefit from having additional information that allows them to make an informed choice. Retailers would be able to collect the market premium that consumers are willing to pay on low carbon goods, and they would also have an incentive to create supply chain management systems that address carbon issues before it becomes a legal requirement. Early adoption of such systems may well produce first-mover advantage over competitors in the longer-term.

There are a number of difficulties associated with these standards, however. Much of the demand for carbon standards stems from the fear that producers in developed countries will simply outsource their production to developing countries that are not burdened with emission caps. There is often the assumption that imported food and agriculture goods will automatically have a higher carbon footprint due to greater transport emissions. This assumption can often be inaccurate, however, as developing countries often rely on less carbon intensive methods of agriculture by using less fertiliser, mechanisation, and energy for heating. To calculate the true carbon cost of a good, those setting standards might rely on Life Cycle Analysis to gain a more exact measurement. So far, however, methods for fully verifying and monitoring carbon emissions are not fully reliable. They also place an expensive additional burden on producers, who might be expected to pay for this verification.

The second concern is based on the idea of ‘ecological space’ — the concept of measuring and comparing countries’ current or historical greenhouse gas emissions and calculating each country’s share of the total additional emissions that the planet can sustain without serious disruption to climate. The relatively low contribution of emissions from developing countries (less than 15 percent of historical carbon emissions) and the fact that they currently emit far less per capita than developed nations (the poorest are just 2 percent of those in the US) would allow them the ecological space for non-restrictive economic development. When reducing demand for imports (particularly in agriculture) from developing countries, we place the burden of reducing emissions unfairly on to those least responsible for them. This would be contrary to the UN climate change convention’s recognition of global inequity in responsibility for dealing with climate change. The carbon issue needs to be seen in light of the Kyoto Protocol’s identification of clear and differentiated responsibilities for developed and developing nations.

The third concern is that carbon standards could result in a trade-off between environmental and development concerns. Agricultural trade and a move away from subsistence style of farming have been promoted in developing countries for many reasons including boosting incomes, encouraging investment in infrastructure and education, improving access to export markets, and creating a source of foreign exchange. Where agricultural development provides high benefits, cutting off demand for these imports for the sake of environmental concerns comes with a high cost to poverty reduction and economic and social development goals.

This paper looks at the existing types of carbon standards and makes the following policy recommendations:

• Carbon footprints can play a role in reducing carbon dioxide emissions in the food systems. Whether this is a problem for developing country exports is unclear.

• It is important to clarify the roles of private standards and public legislation in addressing carbon concerns in the food system.

• It is critical to learn from successes in the sustainable food trade between developing country producers and consumers in the developed nations. These successes should be scaled up and the principles that underlie those successes should be identified and understood.

• Analysis of carbon emissions provides a lens through which one can analyse broader issues affecting sustainable development in agricultural sectors in developing countries.

• Consumer-facing carbon labels and carbon private voluntary standards are unable to limit emissions effectively without appropriately priced environmental externalities.

• The potential for private sector buyers to insist on contractual reductions in carbon for a product harbour the greatest potential for actual carbon reductions in the food system.

The current phase of negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is set to lay the groundwork for the necessary policy reforms, and will require concerted and cooperative efforts by individual countries, the business sector and civil society. Innovation – with regard to both the technologies of the future and the regulatory frameworks used to usher them in at the scale needed – will be key to the successful implementation of the Convention. In this context, both the global trade regime through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and regional trading arrangements may need to be moulded and reformed to support action on climate change.

Addressing climate change and energy security requires massive and rapid deployment of more efficient, cleaner technologies that promote clean growth and economic gain. Carefully crafted trade policies could contribute to a rapid diffusion and transfer of clean technologies around the world and provide new incentives for innovation and investment in climate-friendly technologies.

In this regard, ICTSD’S Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade, and Sustainable Energy (the Global Platform) launched a mapping exercise of commercially available technologies and goods as well as those undergoing R&D (with a strong prospect of commercialization in a five- to 10-year time horizon) in three sectors: renewable energy supply, buildings, and transport. Once peer reviewed by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change lead experts, these mapping studies set the stage for customs classification and a subsequent detailed analysis of their market drivers, trade flows, and trade barriers. The mapping study for the renewable energy supply, residential and commercial buildings and transportation sectors were prepared by experts from the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (“ECN”), the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), India and the Energy Research Institute (ERI), China respectively. These sectors have been identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) as one of the critical sectors for mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

This paper synthesizes findings from these three mapping studies commissioned by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (“ICTSD”) and also includes an overview of key policies and measures important for the uptake of some of the technologies identified in these mapping studies. It also includes some findings on international trade in many of the products associated with these technologies and the trading opportunities, particularly for developing countries.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ICTSD or the funding institutions. The full version of the mapping studies as well as detailed analyses on international trade are available or will be made available shortly on www. ictsd.org.

Rene Vossenaar is from the Netherlands and presently lives in Brasilia, Brazil. He worked for the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and was also the Head of the Trade, Environment and Development Branch at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Since his retirement in March 2005, he has carried out work for UNCTAD and other institutions as an independent consultant as well as a resource person.

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The EU has played a leading role in international efforts to combat climate change since the issue appeared on the agenda in the 1980s. The EU was the first party to commit to a stabilization target in 1990. It assumed the toughest target under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and it has made the most ambitious offer for Copenhagen with an autonomous target of 20 percent emission reductions by 2020, relative to the 1990 level, or 30 percent “provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable reductions and economically more advanced developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities.” The EU has also indicated a willingness to contribute between €2 and 15 billion annually to support adaptation and mitigation actions in developing countries, although the exact number is yet to be fixed by the Council.

The EU has emerged as a leader on climate change despite many obstacles. Collectively, the EU isresponsible for 13.8 percent of current emissions of greenhouse gases, with individual shares ranging from 0.01 to 2.8 percent. None of the Member States are large enough to influence the global emission trajectory in any significant way, nor is the EU as a collective, since global emissions are growing faster than what the EU can offset alone. The leadership is especially interesting in that Member States have veto power over key aspects of climate policy, including fiscal measures and energy policy. The EU cannot order Member States to phase out fossil fuels in favour of renewable energies, nor can the EU impose a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system without the agreement of all Member States.

With the growing recognition that innovation is key for economic growth and development, developing countries are currently considering a range of policies to promote innovation; many of these import or adapt policies from other countries.

Multilateral discussions also stress innovation policies: The World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO’s) Development Agenda emphasizes the need to promote creativity and innovation in developing countries (Recommendation 19), and to consider intellectual property (IP) policies that serve this end (Recommendation 25).

In this context, several developing countries, including India, Brazil, South Africa, Malaysia, and Jordan, are debating or have recently passed legislation modeled on the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act which facilitated patenting by American research universities.

As has been well documented by the proponents of Bayh-Dole type initiatives, since 1981, university patenting and licensing have increased dramatically, as has licensing income from university research. These data provide a main impetus for initiatives to emulate Bayh-Dole in developing countries.

The policy brief provides an assessment of one such bill, the Indian Bayh-Dole Act. It focuses on India because legislation is currently under consideration there; however, many of the issues considered are relevant for other developing countries.

It suggests that India—and other countries considering legislation of this sort—should provide specific guidance about what sorts of publicly funded research outputs ought to be patented, and what should instead be placed in the public domain.

The policy brief underscores the need to evaluate the positive and negative impact of Bayh-Dole type legislation and consider the range of other models and approaches that have evolved in the post-Bayh-Dole era, in response to these concerns.

The policy brief is also available at iprsonline.org

Transfer and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies (EST), in particular to developing countries, is a key element of any effective international response to the global climate change challenge and one of the pillars of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). More recently, the Bali Plan of Action called for enhanced action on technology development and transfer.

In this context, the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has been the subject of increased attention in climate change discussions since Bali. Different views and positions have emerged pointing to the role of IPRs in either facilitating or hindering the transfer of EST.

In this regard, the parallel is often made, explicitly or implicitly, by government officials, and other stakeholders, with the access to medicines issue either to reinforce arguments about the role IPRs as an obstacle to the transfer of EST or to dismiss them, in view of the differences between the relative importance of IPRs for the pharmaceutical sector and the renewable energy sector.

Beyond simplistic comparisons and rethorical statements, analysis and research are critically needed to examine, in a constructive manner, lessons to be drawn from the debate on intellectual property and public health to better inform discussions on innovation, technology transfer and IPRs in the context of the climate change negotiations.

Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons from the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public Health by Professor Frederick M. Abbott (Issue Paper No.24) precisely aims to achieve this.

This new issue paper examines different categories of IPRs and the ways they may have different effects and implications for EST as compared with pharmaceutical technologies. It also points to a number of lessons that can be drawn from the public health-related negotiations, at the WTO and other forums, that may be useful to negotiators and policy makers in addressing climate change, transfer of technology and IPRs.

In this connection, the paper underlines that focus should be placed in establishing frameworks for mutually beneficial joint venture economic arrangements between developed and developing country enterprises to stimulate innovation. To the extent possible, technology transfer commitments resulting from climate change negotiations should be specific and concrete. “Soft” commitments on transfer of technology typically do not bear fruit.

Even if current multilateral IPRs rules incorporate flexibilities and exceptions adequate to address most foreseeable obstacles to technology transfer, the paper suggests that a declaration comparable to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health with respect to IPRs and climate change may be useful in the progressive development of international law, so that it properly balances the rights of innovators and access by the public to the benefits arising from new technologies.

Finally, the paper reflects on the urgent need for further evidence based analysis to inform current discussions on climate change, technology transfer and IPRs. For this purpose, and building on previous research in this area, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) has joined forces with the European Patent Offi ce (EPO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to undertake a joint project to examine the role of patents in the development and transfer of EST, in particular in the field of energy generation. This initiative is expected to provide input into ongoing discussions on technology transfer in the context of the UNFCCC at COP-15 in Copenhagen.

Ultimately, it is important to recall that IPRs are only one among many other factors which impact technology transfer. Other factors such as the enabling environment, in particular financing, adequate incentives and institutions, do play an essential role and require also vigorous action.

This paper was commissioned under the ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development as part of ICTSD’s Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy which is specifically aimed at contributing to effective international cooperation towards addressing climate change, by advancing analytical capacity of stakeholders and their interaction with policy makers such that effective solutions can be built and agreed by the international community at the Copenhagen COP-15, in December 2009.
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With the assumption into office of the Obama Administration and its renewed prioritization of climate change issues, the United States Congress has ratcheted up deliberations on various bills, such as the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (S. 3036) and the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security Act (draft text). Regulations at the sub-federal or state level are likewise increasingly relevant vis-à-vis federal policies. In the European Union, member economies are preparing the next phase of the ‘Emissions Trading System’ and considering options in the absence of a major international agreement to cap greenhouse gas emissions. Japan, Australia and Canada are also deep into consideration of analogous measures.

Despite the obvious ramifications on their countries’ trade competitiveness and sustainable development aspirations, many developing country trade policy-makers and negotiators remain at the fringe of the climate change debate. An enhanced level of understanding of the different approaches evolving among the key OECD countries is crucial if the various stakeholders are to have an enlightened dialogue on the development implications of OECD countries’ domestic policies to address climate change.

In an effort to bridge the different spheres of knowledge and provide opportunity for an exchange of perspectives, particularly among those who are not often included in similar consultative processes, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the Environment and Trade in a World of Interdependence (ENTWINED) Programme organized a dialogue among select representatives from developing country trade and/or economic ministries, think-tanks and universities, Geneva-based developing country ambassadors and a few OECD member country government representatives. The activity, scheduled on Tuesday, 5 May 2009, was hosted by Resources for the Future (RFF)  at the RFF Conference Center in Washington DC. This event was held as a separate and distinct initiative of ICTSD’s Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade Policies and Sustainable Energy but took place in the context of the Washington Dialogue Series slated for the same week. Thru this initiative, ICTSD and ENTWINED hope to:

(i)explore the development aspects of selected OECD countries’ domestic trade policies intended to address climate change, and
(ii)provide a platform for interaction and exchange amongst trade negotiators/policy-makers, private sector representatives, academia and civil society from both OECD as well as developing countries.

Esto a su vez se inserta en un contexto internacional donde la agenda de la Organización Mundial de Comercio (OMC) y los Acuerdos de Libre Comercio que se multiplican alrededor del mundo, intentan definir el rumbo y la dinámica de los intercambios comerciales entre las regiones y países.

Frente a la OMC y estos procesos de liberación comercial, los Acuerdos Multilaterales de Medio Ambiente (AMUMA) plantean retos y desafíos en la medida que las posiciones de los países desarrollados-orientadas a incrementar niveles y estándares de protección ambiental -se contraponen a la posición de los países en desarrollo que encuentran en estos mismos Acuerdos algunos escollos (por ejemplo en el ámbito laboral, productivo y comercial) que se perciben como limitantes para las posibilidades de progreso social y económico.

Dentro de la OMC, entre los múltiples temas que se abordan y, especialmente como parte de la Ronda de Doha, se encuentra precisamente, cómo compatibilizar la necesidad de promover un crecimiento económico en el tiempo (muchas veces presionando sobre el ambiente y los recursos naturales) al mismo tiempo que se mantienen o mejoran niveles de protección ambiental que permitan el mantenimiento de los sistemas ecológicos y, en general, un medio saludable para los seres humanos.

El trabajo de Jaime García “Hacia una Lista Potencial de Bienes Ambientales para Sudamérica: Criterios para una Perspectiva de Desarrollo Sostenible”, ofrece un análisis bastante pormenorizado de una de las variables más controvertidas dentro de los debates internacionales al interior de la OMC y otros foros. A saber, cómo entender la noción de “bienes ambientales” de manera que permita a los países en desarrollo- especialmente a los países andinos -posicionarse mejor en estas discusiones y sacar ventaja de un hecho incontrastable: una riqueza en términos de biodiversidad a nivel de ecosistemas, especies y recursos genéticos. Paradójicamente, esta enorme riqueza contrasta con niveles de pobreza alarmantes en estos países que inciden en una continua degradación ambiental y la disminución de la calidad de vida en general.

García describe claramente cómo los países desarrollados han logrado (con matices) definir y precisar lo que son bienes ambientales y plantear para ellos, por ejemplo, la eliminación de aranceles. Estos países entienden claramente las implicancias de diferenciar entre definiciones tradicionales de “bienes ambientales” (donde tienen ventajas en las negociaciones internacionales) que incluyen la gestión de la contaminación, la generación de tecnologías limpias y métodos de producción más eficientes y definiciones más amplias que podrían incluir productos ambientales tales como fibras controles biológicos, productos no maderables del bosque, productos resultantes de eco-negocios, entre otros, donde los países en desarrollo tiene más bien mejores posibilidades por explotar en estas mismas negociaciones.

En ese sentido, los países sudamericanos, en esencia, no han logrado por distintas razones tales como el desinterés político, limitadas capacidades institucionales y hasta desconocimiento de la relevancia de los temas, armonizar sus posiciones y en algunos casos tienen una participación casi nula o muy poco relevante en el contexto de las negociaciones internacionales donde se discute sobre los bienes ambientales y el comercio.

Esto último, como lo sugiere el autor, hace evidente una limitada articulación entre actores de la sociedad civil, el sector empresarial y productivo y el Estado en la evaluación de opciones y generación de estrategias para sacar ventajas en el ámbito de las negociaciones comerciales internacionales (especialmente en la OMC) de una mayor riqueza potencial en cuanto a bienes ambientales casi connaturales al medio geográfico y ecológico de estos países.

El trabajo de García se hace también bastante digerible en la medida que incluye una serie de conclusiones y recomendaciones pertinentes al tema de los bienes ambientales. Los anexos y especialmente a bibliografía utilizada ofrecen una herramienta útil para profundizar y ampliar el análisis de los temas.

Jaime García es Economista y catedrático de la Universidad de Lima y su investigación fue financiada a través del Programa de Bienes y Servicios Ambientales del Centro Internacional para el Comercio y el Desarrollo Sostenible (ICTSD) con sede en Ginebra, Suiza y que a su vez ha sido apoyado por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Luxemburgo.

Sin duda, el trabajo de García constituye un excelente esfuerzo por sistematizar y sintetizar información y datos relevantes para a partir de ello proponer algunas reflexiones que deben contribuir a despertar el interés de los países y sus diferentes actores en los procesos de negociación comercial- ambiental internacional, con particular énfasis en las actualmente un tanto lentas negociaciones en el ámbito de la OMC.